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Using firm-level data for Italy, we address the employment consequences of international 
production offshoring. 
We concur with previous literature that offshoring firms’ individual employment 
performances are no worse than at matching non-offshoring firms. However, offshoring 
might impart negative spillover effects on subcontracting firms, and this indirect effect 
might be felt particularly in Italy’s industrial structure (small-sized networked enterprises). 
To study this, we group firms within their typical subcontracting clusters, identify high-
offshoring clusters and compare them with a matching low-offshoring sample. The 
evidence that employment performances worsen in the productive clusters with high-
offshoring supports our conjecture. 
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This paper addresses the employment effects of international production offshoring 
(henceforth, offshoring) building on a firm-level database compiled at ISAE on the basis of 
two ad-hoc surveys run in May 2003 and April 2005. First, we study the effects of 
offshoring directly on employment levels of offshoring firms. Next, we investigate whether 
offshoring has an indirect impact on employment as well via spillover effects from 
offshoring companies to subcontracting firms. 
Previous studies investigated only the direct occupational consequences at offshoring 
firms per se. We make a contribution by addressing the possible spillover effects on 
employment exerted by offshoring. Specifically, we posit that considering only the 
employment performance at offshoring firms per se is incomplete, if not potentially 
misleading. Offshoring firms may, in fact, discontinue their commercial relations with 
(some) domestic subcontractors. In turn, the employees bearing the brunt might be those of 
subcontracting firms rather than those employed directly at offshoring firms. 
While these spillover effects may be at work in any country, it could be easier to 
identify them in an economy like Italy, populated by a myriad of networked small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The occupational impact of offshoring at large 
enterprises might be limited within the individual company – possibly shifting labor across 
different mother company’s departments and/or group affiliates. On the contrary, in a 
system of networked SMEs,  the bulk of unskilled labor intensive phases of production are 
already outsourced to subcontracting firms, which may be the heaviest bitten by offshoring. 
For this reason, our analysis tries to uncover also the occupational consequences of 
offshoring for entire productive clusters, including both subcontracting firms and 
offshoring companies per se. As we will see, our results detect a non-trivial indirect impact 
of offshoring on cluster-level employment levels. 
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 sketches a brief survey of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 is devoted to illustrate our database, and display some descriptive evidence. In 
Section 4, we perform our econometric analyses and present the related results. Section 5 
draws to a close by discussing policy implications and research avenues for the future. 
 
2. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
In the last decade, a boom in theoretical and empirical literature on the domestic 
effects of international production offshoring (henceforth, “offshoring”) followed the 
political and social concerns that relocating (part of) business abroad depletes employment 
and worsens performance at home. 
In this respect, theoretical works outlined the features, rationale and likely effects of 
offshoring, but their arguments are not conclusive. A very general (and popular) view states 
that whether firms opt for vertical or horizontal investment abroad, activities at home can 
be affected positively or negatively, depending on: a)  the intensity of technological 
integration between the activities at home and those moved abroad (in case of vertical 
investments), and b) whether the foreign and domestic productions are complements or 
substitutes (in case of horizontal investments). Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) 
provide a comprehensive discussion on this subject. Not surprisingly, then, economic 
debates are mostly on the empirical ground. 
The effects of offshoring on domestic activities and performance of firms investing 




Japanese manufacturing firms, foreign outsourcers and exporters tend to be less productive 
than firms active in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but more productive than domestic 
firms. Other studies tackle labor market consequences. Using Italian data for 1985-1995, 
Mariotti  et al. (2003) find that outward FDI reduces the labour intensity of domestic 
production in case of vertical investment in less developed countries, while increasing it in 
case of horizontal (market-seeking) investment in advanced countries. Head and Ries 
(2002), again on manufacturing data for Japan, show that FDI in low-income countries 
enhances domestic skill intensity.  
In a way closer to our paper, other authors deal with the “jobs creation vs. depletion” 
issue. Brainard and Riker (1997) find only a partial substitution between employment in a 
firm’s foreign affiliates and the parent at home, suggesting that domestic employment 
performance of the multinationals need not worsen after offshoring. Other studies show that 
a substitution relationship would emerge for affiliates in developed countries (e.g. Konings 
and Murphy 2006). According to Amiti and Wei (2005), offshoring led to job losses in the 
U.K. during the period 1995-2001 neither in manufacturing nor the services sectors. On 
Irish data, Görg et al. (2004) detect a positive effect of offshoring particularly for large 
firms and for those based in broader international exports. 
The likely positive effects of offshoring on firm performance at home have been 
confirmed by an important strand of literature focusing on the construction of a proper 
counterfactual for the firms venturing into offshoring, to which the performance after 
offshoring is compared. For instance, Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2004), construct a 
counterfactual focusing on the Italian firms investing abroad for the first time and carry out 
a difference-in-difference estimate to assess the issue (see also Egger and Pfaffermayr 
2003, for a similar analysis on Austrian firms, and Barba Navaretti et al. 2005, for the case 
of France). Then, they show that the net effects of outward investments on the domestic 
business are positive both in terms of total factor productivity and output growth, while 
investing abroad has no significant effect on the rate of employment growth
1.  
Our paper belongs to this strand of literature, but adds a new perspective. Indeed, the 
mentioned studies deal with the offshoring effect on the performance of investing firms per 
se. However, as stated above, this cannot be the end of the story where manufacturing firms 
appear “networked” via close commercial links. Here, non-offshoring firms’ performance 
may well be affected by the outward investment by other firms in the production chain.
2 In 
particular, the effects of offshoring on the employment of the whole productive chain may 
substantially differ from those measured at the offshoring firms per se. 
This is a novel insight in the literature. To capture the impact of offshoring throughout 
the whole productive chain a firm operates in (i.e. something representing networked 
production more closely than the official classification of sectors), we use the 16 “clusters” 
classifying Italian manufacturing industries (Iuzzolino 2005). These clusters are the result 
of aggregating firms’ activities based on the production and territorial links among them, 
                                                 
1 From a different angle  – i.e. focusing on the impact in host country rather than at home – Girma and Görg 
(2007) use the difference-in-difference propensity score matching estimators to investigate the effects of a 
foreign acquisition on wages in the domestic target. They show that in the UK the impact of a takeover of 
domestic establishment by foreign owners depends also on the nationality of the acquirer (it is more sizable if 
the acquirer is from the USA as opposed to the EU) and the skill group of workers (it is positive both for 
skilled and unskilled workers, but only if the acquirer is a US multinational). 




which, in turn, are drawn from the input-output matrices and taking into account the 
distribution of employees within Italy (for more details, see Appendix I). 
 
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
3.1. The data  
ISAE carries out monthly surveys on a panel of over 4,000 Italian manufacturing and 
extractive firms with no less than 10 employees. The ISAE sample is proportional to the 
universe, layered by regions, sectors, and firm size. It covers about 4% of the reference 
universe, that is the set of the ISTAT ASIA archive. ISAE surveys are in keeping with the 
European harmonized scheme. 
In this context, in May 2003 and March 2005 ISAE carried out two ad hoc surveys on 
manufacturing firms’ propensity to venture into offshoring (the offshoring section of the 
2005 questionnaire is available on line in Costa and Ferri 2007). The sub-sample of 
manufacturing firms responding to both surveys drops to 3,115 observations. Moreover, to 
focus specifically on manufacturing and to make our model more robust, we dropped those 
observations relating to non-manufacturing, as well as those for which some crucial 
variables reported missing values. By doing so, the final sample is a balanced panel of 
2,419 firms. 
 
3.2. Descriptive evidence 
Referring to 2005, offshoring regards 3.7% of our sample, in terms of number of 
firms, and 6.0% in terms of the domestic employee share of the sample. The noticeable 
difference between the two figures depends on the fact that offshoring is more widespread 
among lager-sized companies (Table 1 – upper panel). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Naturally, the most interesting question is whether offshoring firms – while creating 
jobs abroad – shed jobs at home. We can observe this from two different angles: a) a 
“short-term angle”, by looking at firms offshoring between 2003 and 2005; b) a “medium-
term angle”, by focusing on the companies which had already offshored in 2003 (and 
confirmed to be offshoring in 2005). 
As to the short-term impact, we notice that employees in Italy of the companies which 
venture into offshoring between 2003 and 2005 decrease on average by 5.3% and the 
median increases by 0.6% (Table 1 – intermediate panel). As for the non-offshoring firms 
in the ISAE database, we detect a drop by 1.2% in average employment and a reduction by 
4.3% in the median. Therefore, this seems to suggest that in the short term the benefits for 
the firm in the home country can be controversial as far as employment is concerned, and 
that we need further and more rigorous analyses on the subject, as we will see in Section 4 
below. Regarding the medium-term impact, the descriptive results depict a similar picture: 
employees in Italy of the companies which were already offshoring in 2003 (and still 
offshore in 2005) decrease by 6.8%, while the median increases by 0.4%. 
In addition, as mentioned, we cannot stop at evaluating the employment performance 
of offshoring firms, but we need also to investigate the possibility that offshoring 
companies trigger negative externalities at sub-contracting firms within the productive-




more so, in a productive structure like Italy’s one, consisting of myriads of networked 
enterprises. 
A first clue on the issue can be gleaned by comparing the average degree of 
offshoring in each cluster in 2003 (OFFCL03)
3 with the employment growth rate of the 
corresponding cluster between 2003 and 2005 (DPEMPL). Only in three clusters the two 
variables have the same sign, and in the “best performing” clusters (in terms of change in 
employment) the offshoring is low or nearly absent (Table 1 – lower panel). 
 
4. The firm- and cluster-level employment impact of offshoring 
In any case, the mere descriptive evidence derived from the ISAE database offers 
some insights on the topic in question, but does not allow us to draw with confidence any 
conclusion about the underlying causal links. To be able to confirm or reject those clues, 
we need econometric analysis, both at firm and at cluster level. 
 
4.1. The impact of offshoring on the firm’s employment 
A most of the literature has already pointed out (see, among others, Brouwer et al. 
2004, Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004, Barba Navaretti and Castellani 2005), from an 
analytical point of view, assessing the influence of offshoring on firm employment 
typically implies a counterfactual problem, namely assessing what would have happened to 
the employment of the firm had this not ventured into offshoring. That is, we need to 
compare an observable outcome – the performance of offshoring firms – with a non–
observable one – the performance of the same firms had they not relocated their activity 
abroad. The problem is how to approximate the latter. The “natural” candidate is the 
performance of the non-offshoring firms in the sample, but this would not be acceptable, 
because the set of these firms cannot be drawn randomly (we are in a “non experimental” 
field). In fact, the choice as to whether or not to offshore is not random but endogenous, 
depending on the characteristics of each firm and the context it operates in. This is the so-
called “self-selection” problem, that is usually overcome by means of matching methods. 
As it is known, the rationale consists in constructing an appropriate counterfactual by 
matching each “offshoring” firm with a “non-offshoring” companion which had similar 
structural characteristics and (as a result) a similar ex-ante probability of investing abroad, 
but eventually did not. In other words, we need to identify a set of firms as similar as 
possible to the observable offshoring ones, apart from the fact that they did not invest 
abroad. This set of selected non-offshoring firms is then the counterfactual (the so-called 
“control” group), the performance of the “offshoring” group we have to compare to. 
In line with the relevant literature on this subject (e.g. Egger and Pfaffermayr 2003, 
Barba Navaretti and Castellani 2004, Kraft and Ugarković 2006, Girma and Görg 2007), 
we applied the propensity score matching procedure.
4 In doing so, from the original sample 
consisting of 3.115 firms, we constructed a balanced panel of 2.419 observations to exclude 
missing values.
5 
                                                 
3 The mean is weighted by the employees in 2003. 
4 For a comprehensive review of the propensity score matching and its variants, from both a theoretical and 
practical viewpoint, see Wooldridge (2002), Blundell and Costa Dias (2002), Bryson et al. (2002), Dehejia 
and Wahba (2002), Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005), and Ichino (2006). 
5 In this respect, the most problematic variable is the share of exports in turnover, showing about 230 missing 




In carrying out the procedure, we first run a probit estimation of the probability of 
offshoring between 2003 and 2005 (the “propensity score”) on the basis of specific 
structural features, then we matched each offshoring firm to its nearest neighbour in terms 
of the propensity score, and the resulting set of neighbours is the control group.
6 
The estimate of the propensity score is performed via the following probit regression: 
 
Prob (off0305i=1 ⎟ emp03i, exp03i, expsq03i, offsec03j, offreg03r, specreg03j,p, tradi, scali, 
speci, nwi, nei, cei)            ( 1 )  
 
where: OFF0305i is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm ventured into offshoring 
between 2003 and 2005; EMP03i is the logarithm of the number of employees in 2003 for 
the firm i; EXP03i is the share of export on firm turnover in 2003; EXPSQ03i is the square 
of EXP03i; OFFSEC03j is the intensity of offshoring in sector j (i.e. the logarithm of the 
share of offshoring firms in the sector j, Ateco-3 digit); analogously, OFFREG03r indicates 
the intensity of the offshoring phenomenon in region r (i.e. the share of offshoring firms in 
the region); SPECREG03jr expresses the intensity of specialization of the region r in terms 
of employees (i.e. the share of employees of the region r employed in industry j, Ateco-3 
digit);  TRADi,  SCALi and SPECi  are three dummy variables following the well-known 
classification by Pavitt (1984);
7 and NWi, NEi, CEi are three dummies expressing the Italian 
macro-areas the firm operates in (North-West, North-East and Centre, respectively).  
 
The results are listed in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
As expected, among the determinants of the choice of relocating production abroad, 
the firm’s size, the share of exports on turnover (a proxy for the “openness” of the firm, 
with the linear effect prevailing throughout the sample), the intensity of offshoring in the 
sector all play an important role. We detect also some industry effect: with respect to high 
tech industries, operating in traditional sectors tends to increase the probability of 
offshoring. Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, our data fail to capture any significant 
territorial effect, with the partial exception of the North-Eastern regions, that exhibit a more 
positive effect on the probability of offshoring than the Southern-Island regions’ one. 
                                                                                                                                                     
values of that variable are obtained by means of a linear interpolation. The final results, for both the psmatch2 
and Becker and Ichino’s algorithms (see the following note 8), are in fact reinforced. So are they in the 
computations of DID and SM estimators. 
6 The matching procedure has been performed using the module psmatch2 of STATA (version 9). In light of 
the characteristics of our sample and the limited number of “treated” firms with respect to “untreated” ones, 
we decided to use the average of the three nearest neighbours with replacement (to reduce the variance of the 
estimates), impose a caliper of 0.005 (to exclude poor matching) and impose the belonging to a common 
support for treated and untreated units. Smaller calliper have been excluded because too many treated units 
were not matched so that the results were not longer representative of the population of the treated (see. 
Becker and Ichino, 2002). Moreover, for consistency purpose we also replied the analysis using the Radius 
matching method (which allows for all of the comparison members within the calliper, see Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002, and Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). The results do not change qualitatively. 
7 Pavitt (1984) classifies manufacturing industries in four categories: a) traditional industries; b)  scale 




The matching technique helps to insulate the effect of offshoring on employment 
from these ex-ante factors. Since the counterfactual needs to be as close as possible to the 
group of “treated” firms, a way to test whether this requirement (the balancing property) is 
fulfilled consists in comparing the average firm characteristics between the groups before 
and after the matching. In the latter case, we should observe very smoothed differences. 
The comparison is shown in Table 3, where the characteristics of the firms and the test of 
the equality in means are reported. 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Before the matching, the offshoring (the “treated”) firms appear larger and more 
export-oriented with respect to the non-offshoring ones, and operate in sectors and in 
regions where the offshoring strategy is more intense. After the matching, on the contrary, 
the differences are visibly mitigated, and no difference in means between the two groups of 
firms is significant. 
At this point, it is possible to use the matched sample to assess the impact of 
offshoring on employment dynamics at firm level. To do so we used the standard matching 
estimator (SM) and the difference-in-difference estimator (DID). 
As for the former, it is tantamount to a test for the equality of means over treated and 
control groups after offshoring (Barba Navaretti and Castellani 2004), and compares the 
post-offshoring means change in performance between the two groups. In formal terms, 
assuming that: 
 
OFFit is the indicator of the treatment, which takes value 1 if the firm offshores for the 
first time at time t 
1
1 , + ∆ t i Y is the percentage change, between t and t+1, in the number of employees in the 
firm i that offshores for the first time at time t; 
0
1 , + ∆ t i Y is the corresponding performance of the same firm if it had not offshored (i.e. 
the counterfactual we needed to estimate), 
 
the SM is given by 
 
) 1 | ( ˆ 0
1
1
1 = ∆ − ∆ = + + it t t SM OFF Y Y E δ ,          ( 2 )  
 
and it can be estimated applying OLS in the following regression: 
 
i i SM i u x T c Y + + + = ∆ β δ
' ,           ( 3 )  
 
where  T is a dummy variable taking value 1 and 0 in treated and control groups, 
respectively, and x
’ is a vector of covariates to control for other possible sources of 
heterogeneity. 
 
The DID, in turn, compares the mean change in the pre- and post- offshoring 
performance for the offshoring firms, with the mean change in the performance over the 
same period for the control group firms. In doing so, it makes it possible to control for 











1 = ∆ − ∆ − = ∆ − ∆ = − + − + it t t it t t DID OFF Y Y E OFF Y Y E δ ,      ( 4 )  
 
and it is estimated applying OLS in the following regression: 
 
it it t DID t it u x PT P T c Y + + + + + = ∆ β δ γ γ
'
2 1 ,         ( 5 )  
 
where  t = 0,1 denotes pre- and post- offshoring period, respectively; 
T is the aforementioned “treatment” dummy variable; 
P is a dummy variable taking value 0 and 1 in pre- and post- offshoring period, 
respectively; 
PT is a dummy variable taking value 1 if T=1 and P=1, and zero elsewhere; 
x' is the vector of covariates expressing some structural characteristics of the firm.  
 
In particular, the role of x is to allow to control for factors which can affect the 
employment other than that of interest. We then run two symmetric pairs of regressions (3) 
and (5), respectively excluding and including the vector of covariates x. In both cases, 
bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications have been computed. The robust 
estimates are shown in Table 4 below. 
[Table 4 here] 
 
These results suggest some considerations. Firstly, both the SM and DID estimators 
point out that offshoring has a negative effect on firms’ occupational performance; the 
effect of offshoring on firm employment slightly drops in the case of SM but remains 
unchanged if measured by DID. Moreover, as expected, in the regressions none of the 
covariates is significant at all. Thus, these results would induces us to conclude that, on the 
sole basis of the ISAE sample data, in the Italian manufacturing sector the choice to 
venture into offshoring tends to deplete the employment dynamics at firm level. In 2003, 
the newly offshoring firms in our sample employed 14,259 employees; therefore, other 
things being equal, the choice of relocating production abroad is estimated having 
(directly) involved about 1,000 individuals. 
These findings are not strictly in line with current literature, which usually finds a 
positive impact (see e.g. Görg, Hanley and Strobl 2004) or absence of significant effects 
(see e.g. Amiti and Wei 2005; Barba Navaretti and Castellani 2004). However, it should be 
borne in mind that our analysis, taking into account only one offshoring period, essentially 
focuses on the short term occupational effects, and in this case it is possible that the two 
“conflicting” results are complement rather than substitute for each other. Furthermore, 
three additional considerations suggest to be prudent: (i) the scarce significance of the 
DID; (ii) the fact that in both the SM and the DID estimates the significance of the model 
drops dramatically when we introduce the covariates; (iii) the limited number of “treated” 
firms (only 55). All in all, we deem this aspect deserves further investigation in the future. 
In addition, in spite of all the attention devoted to the employment consequences of 
offshoring, what the literature may have (so far) neglected is that this issue has not one but 
two dimensions: the direct impact (just addressed) but also an indirect impact. In other 
words, as stated above, manufacturing companies are generally tightly linked to a network 




of view, offshoring could heavily affect also the productive chain at large where the 
offshoring firm belongs. Furthermore, in theory, offshoring could even deliver a “not-so-
negative” direct impact at the firm per se, helping it to limit job losses, while, at the same 
time, exerting a negative indirect impact on the firm’s productive chain, because of the 
termination of close trade relationships linking firms’ businesses, such as subcontracting 
and so on. 
 
4.2. The impact of offshoring on the cluster employment 
In order to obtain reliable results assessing the indirect occupational effect of 
offshoring, we carried out a new causal analysis. In this respect it is helpful to apply once 
again the propensity score matching methodology. To more precisely address the question 
at stake, we focused on the impact in the region-by-cluster employment. Therefore we 
considered a new dataset broken down by 16 clusters and 19 regions,
8 consisting of 273 
observations (31 region-by-cluster cells are empty). The visible drop in the number of 
observations depends on the fact that now the observation unit of our analysis is no longer 
the firm but the cluster, and we are interested in studying how the employment dynamics 
varies among the production chains, also allowing for some territorial effect. 
In this way, the first step of the new matching procedure is the following probit 
regression, estimating the probability of observing newly offshoring firms in a given region 
and within a given cluster (i.e. the variable OFF0305jr):
9 
 
Prob (OFF0305cr=1 ⎟ EMP01cr, OFFCL03cr, EXP03cr, SPECLcr, NWcr, NEcr, CEcr) (6) 
 
where: EMP01cr is the logarithm of the average number of employees in cluster c and 
region r in 2001;
10 OFFCL03cr is the intensity of offshoring in cluster c and region r (i.e. 
the average number of offhoring firms weighted by employee in the same cell) in 2003; 
EXP03cr is the average of the turnover share of exports in cluster j and region r in 2003; 
SPECL03cr is the logarithm of the “intensity of specialization” of the region r in cluster c, 
that is the share of employees of the region r employed in cluster c in 2003; NWi, NEj and 
CEj are the aforementioned territorial dummy variables. 
 
The results are all listed in Table 5 below. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
It appears that also in this “region-by-cluster” case, the probability of observing firms 
investing abroad for the first time between 2003 and 2005 is higher the higher: i) the 
average size of the cluster/region in terms of employees; ii) the past intensity of offshoring 
                                                 
8 Clusters are constructed as stated in section 2 (for more details see Iuzzolino, 2005). As for regions, the 
ISAE sample groups Piemonte and Val d’Aosta together (due to the small size of the latter), therefore we 
have 19 regions instead of 20. 
9 The matching procedure has been performed again by means of the module psmatch2 of STATA (version 
9), using the average of the three nearest neighbours with replacement and imposing a calliper of 0.05 and the 
belonging to a common support for treated and untreated units. Smaller calliper have been excluded because 
too many treated units were not matched. Similar analysis using the Radius matching method generated 
consistent results, as well as further estimates, using the Becker and Ichino’s attnd and attr algorithms, did. 




in the cluster/region; iii) the export propensity; iv) the weight of a given cluster within its 
region. In this context we detect some territorial effects, showing that compared to Italy’s 
Southern regions, the Northwestern and Northeastern ones tend to have a higher propensity 
to offshore in the period considered. 
Here too, moreover, the tests of the equality in means show that before the matching 
the 37 treated units out of 41 offshoring
11 have (on average) larger size and higher degree 
of past offshoring, exports’ share on turnover and degree of specialization in a given 
production chain, while after the matching all these differences are no longer significant 
(see Table 6). 
[Table 6 here] 
 
Again, to assess the causal effect of offshoring on employment dynamics – this time 
at the region-by-cluster level – it is worth using the standard matching estimator (SM) and 
the difference-in-difference estimator (DID), in the same vein as we have done in the firm-
level analysis (see section 4.1.). Now: 
 
t is the offshoring time; 
1
1 , + ∆ t c Y is the percentage change, between t and t+1, in the number of employees in 
cluster c where the offshoring took place for the first time at time t; 
0
1 , + ∆ t c Y is the corresponding performance of the same cluster if offshoring had not 
occurred, 
and the equivalent expressions for the regressions (3) and (5) are respectively: 
 
c SM c u T c Y + + = ∆ δ            ( 7 )  
 
for the SM, and 
 
c DID c u PT P T c Y + + + + = ∆ δ γ γ 2 1            ( 8 )  
 
for the DID, where T, P and PT are the dummy variables illustrated above. 
 
The results of the two (robust) estimates, here too performed also computing 
bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications, are shown in the following Table 7. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
We find a negative effect of offshoring on employment dynamics within the 
cluster/region: the more intense was the phenomenon in the past in the cluster and the 
region, the lower the employment growth rate. Even though the significance is limited to 
95%, this result appears to be quite robust: not only are the effects estimated by SM and 
DID virtually the same, but they do not change at all when covariates – none of which turns 
out to be significant – are introduced. Secondly, as far as the DID is concerned, also the 
significance of those effects is unchanged. Thirdly, differently from the results relating to 
                                                 




the firm-level employment effects of offshoring, here the significance of the DID model 
specification is robust to the introduction of the covariates. 
All this, therefore, suggests that considering the cluster and the regional area, in the 
short-medium term the employment dynamics tends to be poorer the more intense the 
offshoring phenomenon in the area and in the production chain. More precisely, the region-
by-cluster contexts in which firms decided to offshore for the first time between 2003 and 
2005 suffered from an employment reduction of about 2%. In absolute terms, this affected 
about 5,500 employees in our sample. Therefore, these results seem to confirm that 
offshoring may actually shed jobs, especially when – correctly – accounting for its spill-
over effects throughout the production chain. 
Some insights of the distributional impact across the production chains – i.e. our 
cluster/region observation units – emerge when we introduce cluster dummies into the DID 
regression. The results are reported in Table 8, where the dummy excluded refers to the 
Paper-and-printing cluster (see Iuzzolino 2005). The coefficients of these dummies add up 
on the constant, and express the additional occupational effects detected for the offshoring 
observation units within each cluster. Thus, all other elements being unchanged: a) the 
reduction in employment is throughout smaller than in the omitted cluster, with the 
exception of the Leather and Footwear cluster (i.e. Textiles, clothing, leather products and 
footwear-4), which shows no significant difference; b) besides the latter and Paper-and-
printing, other clusters with noteworthy (negative) employment effects are Motor vehicles 
and Meat products (Food, beverage and tobacco-2); c)  only the Knitting cluster (i.e. 
Textiles, clothing, leather products and footwear-3) exhibits a positive occupational impact. 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Finally, it is possible to show that the indirect employment effect is even more relevant 
than the direct one. In order to do so, let us notice that the former effect plus the latter one 
add aup to the total employment effect. Since the two effects are each other related, we 
need to disentangle them. To this end, we compute the difference between the two, 
weighting the direct effect through the share of the employees of newly offshoring firms on 
the overall employment of the sample: -0.023 - (-0.07∗14,259/238,756) ≈ - 0.019 
 
Therefore, in our sample, the firm-level effect of offshoring accounts for only 18% of 
the impact on the overall Italian manufacturing employment. The remaining 82% of the 
total employment impact is due to the net indirect occupational effect, which is still 
negative and involves about 4,500 employees in our sample. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aimed to investigate the employment consequences of international 
production offshoring by Italian manufacturing companies. To accomplish this task, we 
availed ourselves of a highly representative firm-level database developed at ISAE building 
on two ad-hoc surveys run in May 2003 and March 2005. 
Besides concurring with previous literature on the occupational impact at offshoring 
firms per se, we extend the analysis to the possible indirect (i.e. cluster-level) employment 
effects. In particular, our analysis suggests that, independently from the firm level effects, 




networked firm situations prevail. Our evidence that employment performances worsen in 
the productive clusters with strongest offshoring supports this conjecture. 
Further analyses – perhaps using richer datasets – may be needed to confirm the 
existence and to establish the economic significance of the indirect employment effects of 
offshoring. Nevertheless, these results may start feeding the policy debate. The negative 
spillover effects of offshoring on the domestic job market provide a negative externality on 
the firms in business relation with those investing abroad. In view of the fact that offshoring 
generally induce a shift from unskilled to skilled labor demand, public programs could be 






The Iuzzolino’s (2005) method for the detection of productive chains 
 
In order to single out the productive relationships which link the firms in a given 
sector and a given area, the Iuzzolino’s (2005) algorithm relies on the input-output (I/O) 
matrices and ISTAT census data on Italian manufacturing firms. 
The procedure firstly detects 7 macro-sectors that can be deemed homogeneous from 
a productive-chain point of view, that is sectors with an internal trade accounting for no less 
than 2/3 of the manufacturing goods used in the production process. To this end, 
aggregating across the 49 branches of the I/O matrices takes into account both horizontal 
and vertical relationships, as they are carried out whithin the same Ateco subsections and 
include in each macro-sector all the branches producing the intermediate goods used in the 
same sector. 
Secondly, the territorial complementarities have been approximated, through a “data 
driven” procedure that selects the sector clusters on the basis of the correlation degree in the 
distribution of employees. In this respect, for every macro-sector a geographical location 
matrix is computed including, for each component sector, the share of employees located in 
each one of the 8,000 Italian municipalities. Then, a cluster analysis is carried out on the 
seven matrices in order to aggregate the component sectors. The 16 clusters used in this 
paper are the result of the algorithm. 
 




cluster  Cluster    Main production  Component sectors  Sectors 3-
digit 
I 1  Food products, beverages and 
tobacco  1  Beverage  Dairy products and ice cream  155 
      1    Grain mill products, starches and starch products  156 
     1    Other  food  products  158 




Tobacco products  160 
 2  Food products, beverages and 
tobacco  2  meat products  Processed and preserved fish and fish products  152 
      2    Processed and preserved fruit and vegetables  153 
      2    Animal and vegetable oils and fats  154 
      2    Meat and meat products  151 




Machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing  2953 
II 3  Textiles, clothing, leather 




     1    Textile  fabrics  172 
      1    Textile finishing services  173 




Machinery for preparing, spinning, weaving and knitting 
textiles 
29541 
 4  Textiles, clothing, leather 
products and footwear  2 Wearing  Leather  clothes  181 
      2    Other wearing apparel and accessories  182 
      2    Furs; articles of fur  183 
      2    Luggage, handbags and the like; saddlery and harness  192 




Man-made fibres  2470 
 5  Textiles, clothing, leather 
products and footwear  3  Knitting  Made-up textile articles, except apparel  174 




Knitted and crocheted articles  177 
 6  Textiles, clothing, leather 
products and footwear  4 Leather  and  shoes  Leather  191 




Other machinery for textile and apparel production, including 
sewing machines 
29542 
III  7  Paper and printing  1  Paper and printing  Pulp, paper and paperboard  211 
      1    Articles of paper and paperboard  212 
     1    Books, newspapers and other printed matter and recorded 
media  221 
      1    Printing services and services related to printing  222 
      1    Reproduction services of recorded media  223 
     1    Prepared  unrecorded  media  2465 
      1    Machinery for paper and paperboard production  2955 
IV 8 
Wood, Furniture, Non-metallic 
mineral products, other 
manufacturing 
1  Glass and glass 
products  Wooden containers  204 
      1    Glass and glass products  261 
      1    Cement, lime and plaster  265 
      1    Articles of concrete, plaster and cement  266 
     1    Sports  goods  364 
    1    Waste oil  23204 
 9 
Wood, Furniture, Non-metallic 
mineral products, other 
manufacturing 
2  Furniture  Wood, sawn, planed or impregnated  201 
     2    Veneer sheets; plywood, laminboard; particle board, fibre 
board and other panels and boards  202 
      2    Builders’ joinery and carpentry, of wood  203 
     2    Other products of wood; articles of cork, straw and plating 
materials  205 
      2    Bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay  264 
     2    Furniture  361 
    2    Machinery for wood products  29564 
 10 
Wood, Furniture, Non-metallic 
mineral products, other 
manufacturing 
3  Jewellery  Jewellery and related articles  362 
     3    Musical  instruments  363 
     3    Games  and  toys  365 
      3    Miscellaneous manufactured goods n.e.c.  366 
    3    Precious metals  2741 
 11 
Wood, Furniture, Non-metallic 
mineral products, other 
manufacturing 
4  Ceramic tiles and 
building products 
 Non-refractory ceramics goods other than for construction 
purposes; refractory ceramic products  262 
      4    Ceramic tiles and flags  263 
     4    Cut, shaped and finished ornamental and building stone and 
articles thereof  267 




Machinery for mining, quarrying and construction  2952 
V 12  Petrolchemicals, rubber and 
plastic products  1  Pharmaceuticals and 
refining  Coke oven products  231 
      1    Refined petroleum products  232 
     1    Basic  chemicals  241 
      1    Pesticides and other agro-chemical products  242 
      1    Paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics 243 




     1    Glycerol; soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing 
preparations; perfumes and toilet preparations  245 
     1    Other  chemical  products  246 
      1    Printing and book-binding machinery and parts thereof   29561 
    1    Non-metal secondary raw materials  3720 
 13  Petrolchemicals, rubber and 
plastic products  2  Rubber and plastic 
products  Nuclear fuel  233 
     2    Rubber  products  251 




Miscellaneous special purpose machinery and parts thereof  29562 
VI  14  Metal and mechanical industry  1  Electronics  Basic precious metals and other non-ferrous metals  274 
      1    Structural metal products  281 
      1    Other general purposes machinery  292 
      1    Office machinery and computers  300 
      1    Electric motors, generators and transformers  311 
      1    Electricity distribution and control apparatus  312 
      1    Insulated wire and cable  313 
      1    Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries  314 
      1    Lighting equipment and electric lamps  315 
      1    Electrical equipment n.e.c.  316 
      1    Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components  321 
     1    Television and radio transmitters; apparatus for line telephony 
and telegraphy  322 
      1    Medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances  331 
     1    Instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, 
navigating and other purposes  332 
      1    Industrial process control equipment  333 




Watches and clocks  335 
  15  Metal and mechanical industry  2  Iron and steel  Basic iron and steel and ferro-alloys  271 
     2    Tubes  272 
      2    Other first processed iron and steel  273 
      2    Foundry work services  275 
     2    Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; central heating 
radiators and boilers  282 
      2    Steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers  283 
     2    Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming services of metal; 
powder metallurgy  284 
     2    Treatment and coating services of metal; general mechanical 
engineering services  285 
      2    Cutlery, tools and general hardware  286 
      2    Other fabricated metal products  287 
     2    Machinery for the production and use of mechanical power, 
except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines  291 
      2    Agricultural and forestry machinery  293 
     2    Machine  tools  294 
      2    Other special purpose machinery  295 
      2    Weapons and ammunitions  296 
     2    Domestic  appliances  n.e.c.  297 
     2    Television and radio receivers; sound or video recording or 




Metal secondary raw materials  3710 
VII 16  Motor vehicles and other 
transport equipment  1  Motor vehicles and 
aircraft  Motor vehicles  341 
     1    Bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; trailers and semi-
trailers  342 
      1    Parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines  343 
     1    Ships  and  boats  351 
      1    Railway and tramway locomotives and rollig-stock  352 
     1    Aircraft  and  spacecraft  353 
     1    Motorcycles  and  bicycles  354 
      1    Other transport equipments n.e.c.  355 
      1    New and used rubber tyres and tubes  2511 
      1    Electrical equipment for engines and vehicles n.e.c.  3161 
     1   Engines  29111 
Source: Iuzzolino (2005). The items in italics are not considered in our paper (where only Ateco up to 3 
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Table 1 – Two links: offshoring-firm size nexus and offshoring-employment dynamics by cluster 
Average and median employees at offshoring vs. non-offshoring companies (2005) 
 Average  Median 
Offshoring 275.2  99.5 
Non-offshoring 81.6  23 
    
Average and median employees at firms offshoring between 2003 and 2005 (Italy vs. the World) 
 Average  Median 
Italy – 2003  241.3  79.0 
Italy – 2005  228.5  79.5 
Italy – 2006  223.2  83.2 
World - 2005  277.3  115.0 
    
Offshoring intensity and cluster employment dynamics (2003-2005 period) 
  Offshoring intensity offshore  
(% of cluster’s firms that offshore) 
Employment dynamics 
(var. % of cluster’s employees 
in the period) 
T1 0.15  -0.08 
M2 0.11  -0.03 
MT1 0.09  0.01 
P1 0.09  -0.01 
T2 0.08  -0.05 
T4 0.08  -0.07 
M1 0.08  -0.03 
W3 0.07  -0.01 
T3 0.06  -0.11 
P2 0.03  0.05 
W1 0.03  0.02 
W2 0.03  0.01 
F1 0.03  0.04 
F2 0.03  -0.02 
PP1 0.02  -0.03 
W4 0.01  0.05 
Note: F= Food products, beverages and tobacco; M=Metal and mechanical industry; MT=Motor vehicles and other transport 
equipments; P= Petrochemicals, rubber and plastic products ; PP=Paper and printing; T= Textiles, clothing, leather products and 
footwear; W= Wood, Furniture, Non-metallic mineral products other manufacturing. See also Appendix I. 
 
Table 2 – Probit regression for the probability of offshoring between 2003 and 2005 
Variable coefficient  Variable coefficient 
emp03 0.215***  Ce  0.127 
exp03 2.092***  Trad  0.540* 
expsq03 -1.974**  Scal  0.095 
Offsec03 0.501*** Spec  0.285 
Offreg03 -2.276  _cons  -2.050*** 
Specreg03  -0.796  Number of obs.  2418
Nw  0.219  Prob > chi2  0.000
Ne 0.397*  Pseudo  R2  0.1511
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Note: OFF0305i is a dummy variable indicating whether firm i ventured into offshoring between 
2003 and 2005; EMP03i is the logarithm of its number of employees in 2003; EXP03i is the share of 
export on firm turnover in 2003; EXPSQ03i is the square of EXP03; OFFSEC03j is the intensity of 
offshoring in sector j (i.e. the logarithm of the share of offshoring firms in sector j, Ateco-3 digit); 
analogously, OFFREG03r measures the intensity of the offshoring phenomenon in region r (i.e. the 
share of offshoring firms in the region); SPECREG03jr is the intensity of specialization of region r in 
industry j in terms of employees (i.e. the share of employees of the region r employed in industry j, 
Ateco-3 digit); TRADi,  SCALi and SPECi  are three dummy variables following the well-known 
classification by Pavitt (1984); and NWi, NEi, CEi are three dummies capturing the Italian macro-





Table 3 – average value of structural characteristics of the firms in treated and control group, 
before and after matching 
   Mean  %  reduct  t-test 
Variable Sample  Treated Control  %  bias  bias  t  p>t 
emp03 Unmatched  4.580 3.476  81.9   6.48  0.000 
 Matched  4.580  4.696  -8.6  89.5  -0.42  0.673 
              
exp03 Unmatched  0.380  0.177  74.7  5.7  0.000 
 Matched  0.380  0.364  5.8  92.3  0.3  0.765 
              
expsq03  Unmatched  0.223 0.099  53.7   4.45  0.000 
 Matched  0.223  0.200  10  81.4  0.5  0.617 
              
offsec03 Unmatched  -2.832  -3.243  68.5    4.49  0.000 
 Matched  -2.832  -2.902  11.6  83.1  0.67  0.504 
              
offreg03  Unmatched  0.056 0.049  32.4   2.21  0.027 
 Matched  0.056  0.056  -0.4  98.9  -0.02  0.983 
              
specreg03  Unmatched  0.045 0.037  14.9   1.08  0.280 
 Matched  0.045  0.051  -13.3  11.1  -0.63  0.531 
              
trad Unmatched  0.564  0.584  -4    -0.3  0.767 
 Matched  0.564  0.545  3.7  8.8  0.19  0.850 
              
scal Unmatched  0.164  0.253  -22.1    -1.51  0.131 
 Matched  0.164  0.170  -1.5  93.2  -0.08  0.933 
              
spec  Unmatched  0.218 0.128  23.8   1.96  0.050 
 Matched  0.218  0.224  -1.6  93.3  -0.08  0.940 
              
nw  Unmatched  0.218 0.196 5.5   0.41  0.682 
 Matched  0.218  0.188  7.4  -36.2  0.39  0.697 
              
ne  Unmatched  0.473 0.296  36.7   2.83  0.005 
 Matched  0.473  0.509  -7.6  79.4  -0.38  0.707 
              
ce Unmatched  0.218  0.254  -8.4    -0.6  0.547 
 Matched  0.218  0.236  -4.3  49.1  -0.22  0.823 
Note: EMP03i is the logarithm of the number of employees in 2003 for the firm i; EXP03i is the 
share of export on firm turnover in 2003; EXPSQ03i is the square of EXP03i; OFFSEC03j is the 
intensity of offshoring in sector j (i.e. the logarithm of the share of offshoring firms in the sector j, 
Ateco-3 digit); analogously, OFFREG03r measures the intensity of the offshoring phenomenon in 
region  r  (i.e. the share of offshoring firms in the region); SPECREG03jr is the intensity of 
specialization of region r in industry j in terms of employees (i.e. the share of employees of the 
region r employed in industry j, Ateco-3 digit); TRADi, SCALi and SPECi are three dummy variables 
following the well-known classification by Pavitt (1984); and NWi, NEi, CEi are three dummies 






Table 4 – The effect of offshoring on firm’s employment growth 
  SM DID SM DID 










Constant  0.025***  0.010 0.023 0.000 
Presence of covariates (a)  NO  NO  YES  YES 
No. of significant covariates (b)
  - -  none  None 
No.  of  obs.  2418 4836 2417 4835 
Replications  500 500 500 500 
Prob  >  chi2  0.001 0.009 0.197 0.076 
R-squared  0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
(a) Covariates include: share of exports on turnover (in quadratic form; in linear form the results are the 
same); percentage of region employees employed in a given sector; sector and macro-region dummies. 
(b) At 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 level. 




Table 5 – Probit regression for the probability of 
offshoring in clusters-by-regions cells between 










No. of obs.  273 
Prob. > chi2  0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.282 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Note:  EMP01cr  is the logarithm of the average 
number of employees in cluster c and region r  in 
2001;  OFFCL03cr  is the intensity of offshoring in 
cluster  c and region r (i.e. the average number of 
offhoring firms weighted by employee in the same 
cell) in 2003; EXP03cr is the average of the turnover 
share of exports in cluster j and region r in 2003; 
SPECL03cr is the logarithm of the “intensity of 
specialization” of the region r in cluster c, that is the 
share of employees of the region r employed in 
cluster  c in 2003; NWi,  NEj  and  CEj  are the 





Table 6 – Average value of structural characteristics in cluster j and region r in treated and control group, before and 
after matching 
   Mean  %  reduct  t-test 
Variable Sample Treated  Control  %  bias  bias t p>t 
Emp01  Unmatched 18.644  8.581 36.3    3.61 0.000 
 Matched  9.856  13.065  -11.6  68.1  -1.43  0.158 
          
Offcl03  Unmatched 0.085  0.056 77.8    4.38 0.000 
  Matched  0.070 0.079 -26.2  66.3  -0.91 0.369 
          
Exp03  Unmatched  0.359 0.160 111.7    6.69  0.000 
 Matched  0.297  0.261  20  82.1  0.81  0.425 
          
Specl03 Unmatched  -2.584  -3.610  81.8    4.58  0.000 
 Matched  -2.880  -2.968  7  91.4  0.31  0.761 
          
Nw  Unmatched 0.268  0.151 28.9    1.86 0.064 
 Matched  0.200  0.273  -18.1  37.6  -0.6  0.551 
          
Ne  Unmatched 0.341  0.194 33.5    2.13 0.034 
 Matched  0.360  0.207  34.8  -4  1.2  0.238 
          
Ce  Unmatched  0.244  0.203  9.9  0.6  0.550 
  Matched  0.240 0.333 -22.3 -125.9 -0.72 0.476 
Note: EMP01cr is the logarithm of the average number of employees in cluster c and region r in 2001; OFFCL03cr is the intensity 
of offshoring in cluster c and region r (i.e. the average number of offhoring firms weighted by employee in the same cell) in 
2003; EXP03cr is the average of the turnover share of exports in cluster j and region r in 2003; SPECL03cr is the logarithm of the 
“intensity of specialization” of the region r in cluster c, that is the share of employees of the region r employed in cluster c in 




Tab 7 –  The effect of offshoring on the sector employment growth  
 Estimator  (a) 
  SM DID SM DID 










Constant 0.016***  -0.039***  0.191**  -0.038*** 
Presence of Covariates
 (b) NO  NO  YES  YES 
No. of significant covariates (c)  -  -  none  none 
No.  of  obs.  273 546 273 546 
Replications  500 500 500 500 
Prob.  >  chi2  0.017 0.000 0.296 0.000 
R-squared  0.015 0.168 0.021 0.170 
(a) SM = standard matching estimator; DID = difference-in-difference estimator. 
(b) Covariates include: the size (overall employment) of the cell; the average share of exports on turnover; 
the percentage of region employees employed in a given cluster; 16 cluster dummies. 
(c) At 0.01, 0.05 or 0.01 level. 





Tab 8 –  The effect of offshoring on the sector employment growth: cluster effects 
  DID 
Effect of Offshoring  -0.023***  
Constant  -0.110*** 
Presence of Covariates (a)
  YES 
Significant covariates (b)  none 
Food products, beverages and tobacco – 1  0.109*** 
Food products, beverages and tobacco – 2  0.038*** 
Textiles, clothing, leather products and footwear – 1  0.059*** 
Textiles, clothing, leather products and footwear – 2  0.058*** 
Textiles, clothing, leather products and footwear – 3  0.205*** 
Textiles, clothing, leather products and footwear– 4  -0.019 
Wood, Furniture, Non-metallic mineral products other manufacturing – 1  0.074*** 
Wood, Furniture, Non-metallic mineral products other manufacturing – 2  0.070*** 
Wood, Forniture, Non-metallic mineral products other manufacturing – 3  0.093*** 
Wood, Forniture, Non-metallic mineral products other manufacturing – 4  0.096*** 
Petrochemicals, rubber and plastic products  – 1  0.072*** 
Petrochemicals, rubber and plastic products – 2  0.091*** 
Metal and mechanical industry  0.075*** 
Metal and mechanical industry  0.068*** 
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment  0.019** 
Number of obs.  546 
Replications  500 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
R-squared  0.658 
(a) Other than the cluster dummies. Covariates include: the size (overall employment) of the cell; the average 
share of exports on turnover; the percentage of region employees employed in a given cluster. 
(b) Other than the cluster dummies. Significance at 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 level. 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Running the same regression excluding the covariates but keeping the 
dummies leads to the same result. 
 